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The Principle of Mechanical Equivalents
as applied in Patent Cases.
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aim of the present article is to explain the

cf a mechanical

principles

equivaleint,

are applied in

order to do this, it

what

the patent

will be necessary

to define an equivalent,

it

is,

and how

law.

In

at the out-set

using for this; purpose short

quotations from some of the many decisions in our

ed-

eral Courts which have grown up since the passage of th
act

of April 10, 1790.

myself to the

in doing so I will confine

,ecisions of our Federal Coutts, as the

discussion of the English cases would lead us far outside of the scope of the present article.

The cases

involving only mechanical equivalents will be referred
to, though many if not all of the rules asserted,
ing to mechanical

equivalents would likewise,

relat-

by analogy,

2
apply to chemical equivalents.

After coming to a

thorough understanding of what an equivalent is, I will
endeavor to show who can invoke its doctrine, and the
extent to which it applies, whether depending upon thp
fact that the inventor is a pioneer in his art, or only
improver of an already known device.

The tcrm"equivalent"
two different ways,

is

used in

and meaning two distinct thiftgs,

which must be kept coistantly in
cases.

the decisions in

rind while reading the

First, then in its ordinary sense it is

synonymou, with identity (1).

It denotes the corres-

pondence between agencies which p ,rform the same fun-tions, and havQ. I the same operative means, relating to
. combinp.tion or device as a whole, rather than to any
particular part or ingredient of the combination (2).
In its second and more restricted or technical sense,
denoting the means or mekani which is used to accomplish
the same result.

Judge Sprague in the celebrated case

of Johnson v. Root, reported in 1 Fisher, 357, very
carefully and clearly shows this destinction.

he says,

"The term equivalent as used in this class of cases, has

4
two meanings.

The one relates to the result.; that are

produced and the other to the mechanism ly which those
results are produced.

The two things may be equi-

valent, that is, the one equivalent

to the other as

producing the sEame result when they are not the same
mechanical means.
Let us iiext pass to the subject of a mechanical
equivalent what it

is

and what are the elements which

compose it.
At the present state of the law it is impossible
to lay down general pri~iciples, accurately defining *hat
a mechanical equivalent is, all the

1cinents co"n-uing

it, or any test which will meet every situation that may
akise, so that, we can readily distinguish whether a
particular machine is an equivalent of another one or
whether it is not.

The cases in the United States

Circuit and District Courts, while many and voluminous,
aid us very little in the complete solution of this
problem.

5
It is likewise evident to the thoughtful reader
that as machinery grows more and more complicated the
difficulty of determining what does and What does not
constitute an equivalent, however accurately it may be
defined, becomes more and more difficult especially so
when we remember that the decision must be reached by a
Judge who hasmade a special study of machinery.

So

it becomes desirable as it is becessary, that the law
upon this subject be left free and it a measure
thus allowing the court, in its judicial

open,

discretion or

+>o the jury, should there be one, to determine upon all
the facts of the case being presented before it, whether
the particular" device in question does or does not infringe the device of the plaintiff.
In

a general way an equivalent may be said to be,

any act or substance which is known by one skilled in
the particular art;as a proper substitute for some
other act or substance employed as an element in the
invention, the substitution of which in io manner varies

6
the idea of means,

such substance

being known at the data

of the invention.
To be a inechainical

equivalent

then it

must be known

by one skilled in the art as a proper substitute for
the element

ii question from his knowledge of the art (1),

Mr. Justice Sawyer in Carter v. Baker,(2)

says

"When in mechanics one device does a particular thing
or accomplishes a particular result, every other device
.......-

which skilled and experienced workmen know

will produce the same result, ------

is a known

mechanical substitute for the first device.
ficient- -----

It

is suf-

when a skilled mechanic sees one de-

vice doing a particular thing, that he knows the other
devices, whose use he
same thing."

is acquaited with, will do the

If a person has an invention, in which he

is called upon by the patent
clear description,\he

(1)
Lac Co.,
v. Root,
(2)

law,

has invented,

to make a full

aad

and if another person

Smith v. i iardhall, 10 O.G., 375; May v. Fon De
supra; Carter v, Baker, 4 Fish., 4041; Johnson
supra.
Carter v. Baker, 4 Fish. , 4:04.
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lookinl

at that,

can from

pass to the other tqin_
tion.

ais k:owleige

that

is

The t.hing substituted
That

ticular

is

to say that if

result

once,

is

that

slbring.

used w'ithout
is

,y

subject

any inven-

an equivalent.

a 11echanic

accomplished

of t 1 -e

(1)

see that a par-

a weight he knows,

at

liae same object can be accomplished by the
Or if the object to

-e accomplished is to

move by force a particular body as close to the other
as possible, and he sees that this is done by means of
a wedge.
the art,
As,

The mechanic knows from his knowledge of
thE t

C

a grew

for example,

will accomplish the same result.

we desire to level up the platen of aii

ordinary prifiting press,
of four set-screws,

this

is

usually done by means

each placed half

of the platen and the corner,

now if

uay from the center
we sibstitute

for

our set-screws, wedges, the wedge is a mechanical equivalent of the screw.

Because the wedge and the

screw would both accomplish the desired purpose, namely,
the"leveling up"of the platen.

It is true that the

(1) Sprague J. , in Johnson v. Root, supra.

wedge and the screw act

on entirely

difi'eerent princi-

ples, yet as to the particular (bject had in view, we
can readily see that either the wedge or the screw would
accomplish the desired result and for our purpose nothing more nor less.
equivalent of

If this

be so, the scrlw is the

the wedge or vica versa.

But it does

not necessarily follow that th~cases the screw is the
equivalent

of the wedge, or that the wedge is of the

screw.
Secondly, it

must perform the same office or func-

tion as the instrument for which

it is substituted,

that i$ to say, that it nust perform this
substantially
A late

the

office

in

same way.

case in

the Supreme Court,

Crochrane v.

Deener, (1) is a good illustration in point.
case involves a construction of Cochrane's
bolting flour.

The

invention for

Crochrane's invention it seems has

revolutionized the process of making flour.

His

Pat ent -was- in
e4g
-by-tlqe - eveiilaft- Pe eier- ad-ethefs
(1) Crobhrane v. Deener, 94 U.S., 780; 4 Otto.

In the course of the opinion the Court said;

"Although

the defendant use a flat bolter instead of a reel, and
used different kinds of valves for feeding and delivering the meal without allowing the air to pass,

yet they

eiploy the combination of devices described in their
claim.
purpose a

They use the collecting chamber for the same
that pointed out in the patent and used it

in connection with a boiler, air pipe, and valves for
feeding and delivering the meal without allowing the
air to pass therewith, each effecting the same separate
purpose, and all combined effecting the same general
purpose, which the like parts are intended to accoma
plish in Crochrane's bolting appk atus.
These parts
having the same pu±tpose, and in the same combination,
and effecting that purpose in substantially the same
manner are the equivalents of each other in that regard.
The Court in the case of May v. Fon De Lac Co.,
cited supra, (i) says, the question is whether the given
effect is produced substantially by the same mode of

(1) May v. Fon De Lac Co.,

27 Fed.,

691, supra p. 6.
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operation and by the same combination of powers and devices

in

both machines.

the defendant's device

The inquiry should be whether
is

in

substance

a colorable evasion of the plaintiff's
whether it

is
If

thing.

really

and effect only
contrivance,

a new and substantially

or

different

the defendant has taken the same general

plan and applied it for the same purpose, and produced
the same effect in substantially the same mode,
be in

contemplation
In

of the patent

order to avoid the charge

substituted

ingredient

form a sulstant1illy

1m

the same thing.

of infringement

must be a new one,

different

it will

function.

the

or must per(1)

Prof.

Robinson in his valuable work upon Patent Law discusses
the whole doctrine of equivalents quite thoroughly.
take a

short quotation from section 253,

"A change

in

the

idea of means is

I

of that work.

a change of substance,

demanding an operation of the creative faculties, and
producing either

a new inve2-tion or an improvement

on

the old."

(1) Webster v.

Brunswick Carpet Co.,

5 0.G.,

522.
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It is evident from our discusion that mere colorable or evasive differences cannot defeat the right of
the originaniventor.(1) Thus the substitution of an
iron frame for one mvie of wood, all the other parts of
the two combinations being
ment (2).

identical,

,.

is

an infringe-

To the same effect i; the case of Putnam

v. Hutinson, (3) where thle use of rubber stoppers in
bottles

was held the equivalent

Another illustration

is

cutting sea weed;

of orrinary plugs.

that of a mowing machine for

(4) the plaintiff used a vertical

vibrating lever pivited near the center;-the
substituted in

its

a cfank attached,

place a vertical

defendant

revolving shaft with

The Courts held that the crank and

shaft being an equivalent of the vibrating lever;

in-

fringement was established.
That two machines produce the same effect

will not

justify the assertion that they are substantially the

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

May v. Fon De Lao Co, supra pp. 6, 9.
Holbrook v. Small, 10 O.G., 508,
Putnam v. Hutinson, 12 Fed., 131.
Piper v. Shedd, 26 Fed., 151.
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same,

or that the device-is used by one are therefore

equivalents for throse of the other

(i).

But neverthe-

less mere formal changes will not avoid the charge of
infringement.

This was one of the earliest establish-

ed principles of patent law (2).

The

tioctrine is now

well settled as a citation of authorities will show. (3)
Mr.

Justice Clifford,

the jurist to whose ability the

developement of the patent law may be said to be largely
due, said in the early case of the Whip Co. against
Lombard (4),"Mere formal alterations of a combination of
latters patent do not constitute any defence #o the
charge of infringement."

If two machines be substant-

ially the same and operate in

the same manner,

though

they differ in form, proportions and utility they are
the same in principle. (5)
~-

The doctrine is repeated in

---------------------------------------------

(1) Burrv. Duryer, I Wallace, 531.
(2) Vincent v. Mathison, 3 Wash., 602; Odine v.
Winkley, 2 Gill., 54.
(3) Roberts v. Harnden, 2 Cliff., 506; Whip Co v.
Lombard 4 Cliff., 405; Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall., 187;
Tathon v. LeRoy, 2 Blach., 474; Graham v. Geneva Co.,
11 Fed., 138; Webster v. Brunswick Carpet Co., supra;
Corvase v. Canon, 9 0.G., 105; Crochrane v. Deener,supra',
May v. Fon De Lac Co., supra; Walker v. City of TerreHaute, 44 Fed., 70.
(4) £iip Co. v. Lombard, 4 Cliff'., 504.
(5) Odiemie v. Winkiey, 2 Gill., 54.
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two late case to quote; "The mechanism of the two machines in v -rious particulars is quite unlike in form, and
their dissimilarity is more apparent from the fact that
defendant's machine is one where the cutting apparatus
is

forward of the axlh wheel.- -----

-I

am of the

opinion that the difference between defendant's and complainant's machines are differences of foem and not of'
substance."(1)

The real invention in Walker v.

the

City of Terre Houte,(44 Fed., 70), consisted in the combination of the designated elements acting in co-operation to accomplish a specified result, and the patent
was not limited to the precise forms of the elements
shown in the drawings.

Elements possessing the

essential qualities and performing the same functions as
those described, although differing in mere mechanical
form vere covered by the original patent.

A conibin-

ation patent earniot be evaded by a mere formal variation
af all or part of the elements.
Our next question whether the omission of a part of
-

--------------------

(1)

Grahamn v.

--

-----------------------------

Geneva Co. , 11 Fed., 1-138.

the device

of a patent retaining the remaindr

stfficient

to avoid the charge

isl

L

of infringement.

sents a question of some difficulty.
combination patents the statement,

Pre-

In this class of

that the charge

of

infringement is not made out, unless all the parts or
elements of the plaintiff's patent are used, (1)
perhaps not to br$q'1
the limitation
tiff's

that

for a general propcxsition,
if

is
with

somw of the parts of the plain-

combination can be proved to be entirely

unessen-

tial to the complete working of the combination, the
immaterial part

ot!. parts may be omitted,

and the use

the rema:niiig parts will be an infringement.

(2)

of
&

good illustration of this proposition is the cellebrated
case in the Supreme Court of Pouty v. Ruggles,(3) where
these facts are present.
plow

The ilaintifr invented a

which was so arranged that when the point of the

plow while cutting through the earth struck a stone or
pther substance

that it could not plow through, the 111

---------------------------------------------------(1) Pouty v. Ruggies, 16 Pet., 336; Tobey v. Colly,
34 0.G., 1276; Voss v. Fisher, 5 Sup.Ct.Rep., 507 at 511l
West Lake v. Carter, 4 0.G., 636; Resull v. Lindslay,
113 U.S., 102; Robiinson on .-atents, & Walker on Patents,

+251.
(2) West Lake v. Carter, 4 O.G., 636; Venee v.
Campbell, 1 Black, 427.
(3)Pouty v. Ruggles, 16 Vet., 336.
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point of the plow would slip back

leaving the obstruc-

tion in the ground.

His device was a patent for a

combination as follows:

first an ordinary plow fastened

to a wooden beam in such a manner that the point of the
plow formed an angle with the ground thus tending to
hold the plow in
half

the ground when actually plowing,

way from the point of the plow, wi

about

the ent which

was pivoted to the horizontal beam, was an arm extending
backward runni.Ig upward so as to pass through t'e end of
the beam which was morticed to receive it.

His third

elemeng was a bolt and arm which passed through this
beam just in front of and at right angles to this mortice, so that by screwing up

the bolt the friction upon

the arm passing through the mortice was increased untill
it was sufficiently tight to hold the standard of the
plow in its place when in use.
movable

A stone or other im-

substance resting the Point of the plow instead

of stopping the horses, would push upon this point sufficiently to move it back away.from its original posi-

16
sition by driving the back arm of the plow up through
the mortive of the shaft: in

this way the plow would

pass over the obstruction without stopping the team or
throwing the driver off of his feet.
The device of the defendant omits 6ntirely the arm
of the plaintiff's plow.

having the standard on which

the shire is fastened, pass up throug i the mortice in
the horizontal beam then curving forward and pivoted to
the beam.

He thus accomplishes the same result az did

the plaintiffj to wit; providing a means whereby the
point is allowed to pass obstructions without the necessity of stopping the horses, backing up (to remove the
plow)

and starting over again.
But his plow is not as strong as that of the plain-

tiff',,

the arm in

the plaintiff's

brace and materially
The defendant in

device acted as a

increased the strength of the plow.

order to get the strength required to

make his plow useful,

is

obliged to largely increase the

sire of the standard on which the shire is

.ttached,
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making

it heavy enough to stand the necessary strain

to which plows are subject.
The elements usei by tie

plaintiff

being all

his patent is for the combination of the three.
Court says, Ci)

old,
The

The use of any two of the three parts

cronlyof two.confined with a third is substantially
different in form or in the means of its arrangement and
connection with the others, is, therefore, not the thing
patented.
stantially

It is not the same combination if it subdiffers in any of its parts.

The joiging

of the standard into the beam, and its extention backward from the bolt, are both treated by plaintif*'as essential parts of their combination for the purpose of
brace and draft, consequently the use of either alone,
by the defendant would not be the same improvement nor
infringe the patent of the plaintiff.
The Circuit Court in Voss v. Fisher, (2) discussing
the same question says, "where one patented combination
is asserted to be an equivalent of another device in one,

(1) Pouty v. Ruggles, supra, see page 341 of case.
(2) Voss v. Fisher, 5 Suo.Ct.R., 507 at 511.
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to be an equivalent

of

-,.

a device in

other, must perf'orm the same functions.
there is

one element of the plainti'ff's

the

And therefore
patented combi,-

ation which the det'endants do not use,

and for which t

they do not employ an equivalent.

It

they do not infringe the plaintiff's

patent.

.

follows that
This

principle has recently been approved by the Supreme
Court in Roswell v. Lindsay, 113 U.S., at page 102,
where the authorties are collected and discussed.
So a patent is not infringed by a combination which
varies from that patented in the omission of one of the
operative parts and the substitution of another part
substatially different in.its construction and operation not withstaiding the fact it serves the same
purpose.(l)
But a cobfoination will be infringed if parts of the
elements are employed and for otheAmechanical equivalents are used.(2)

This qualification if indeed it

may be deemed a qualification of t: e general

rule at

(1) Eames v. Godfrey, 1 Wall, 78; Schmidt v. Truse;
Tobey v. Coly, 34 0.G. 1076; Smith v. Marshall, 10 0.G.75.,
(2) Simpson R.R., 10 How., 329;EAmes v. Godfrey,supra.
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all,

is

constantly met with in practice and for the

purpose of the ]Practitioner is of more importance than
the general rule.
it

more

in

detail

We shall have reason to refer to i
later

Where the change
69 course is present-

(1).
is merely colorableinfringement

L5

this appears to be so evident that

the 7citation of' the numerous authorities is unnecessary.
If the instrument besides being an equivalent,

ac-

complishes something useful beyond the effort or purpose
accomplished by the first patentee;

it will still be an

infringement as respects what is covered by the prior
patent.

(2)

Because as between a device coymeded to

be new and a device claimed to be infringed, the alleged
infringer could not protect himself by showing that although his device wgas the equivalent of the patented
device in all its functions, andAconstruction and mode
of operation,

yet by other additional features

essed other and further

it

useful functions, though it

improvement upon the patented one,

(1) See pagej-/,.iQ(2) Converse v. Cannon,
10 O.G., !7.

is

9 O.G.,

possbe an

as between the

105;

2 Fish.,

31,

20
parties an appropriation of the former device.

Though

the improvement of course would be patentable as an improvement upon the former.(!)

So it may be said to be

immaterial to show that the device accomplishes more,
but if it accomplishes less it is not P.n infringement.(2)
Our last que:,tion under our definition is whether
the particular device must be a known equivalent
date of the invention of the patent.

at the

Mr. WPJV-r, in

his treatise upon the Law of Patents, undertakes to distinguish the 0ses and show that while abundant authority
can be found for the affirmative of the question yet the
decisions on this point are purely dicta, and in view of
some authorities which he cites, he comes to the conclusion that the date of the invention has nothing to do
with the question rf

equivalents.

In the fall of 1865, Mr. Justi= Clifford, while at
Circuit first
ition,

in

introduced this elomncnt

the case of The

T

1nion

irii.c the defin-

Sugar Refinery v. Mat-

thussen, (3) where he said instructing the jury "You are

(1) Cases in proceeding notes.
(2) Walker on Patents, 251 & notes.
(3) The Union Sugar Refinery v. iiatthusse-,,
629.

2 Fish.
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instructedi,

that if

you find from the evidence,

the means of causing pressure
defri.,

Were,

that

at the nozzle used by the

at the date of the invention and of the

patent,

confmonly known as a substitute for the means of
causing ptressure at the nozzle, which were particularly

licussed in

the specification,

and that consequently

those skilled in the art to which the invention appertains,

then the defendant

cannot successfully defend him

self against the charge of infringement."
defense in

this case was,

the otiginal and first
not infringe.

first,

The entire

that their assignor,

inventor; secondly,

is

that they do

So we may say that the question was

fairly before the Court and a material question for
dmi s i on.
The next case that is cited in support of this
proposition is Roberts v. Haen (1).
that this question is

Mvir. Walker say

not presented in

the case.

The

counsel conceded during the trial and at the argument,
that the date of the invention was a material question

(1) Roberts v.

Halen,

2 Clik.,

506.

tending to define what an equivalent was.
case hinged upon the fact that the differences
the ice-chests of the two refrigerators

But the
between

was merely form-

al, they being found by the Court to be substantially
the same.
The Court in the case of the Whip Co. v. Lombard,
(1) said "if the defendant omits tntirely one of the
elements or ingredients of

the pantented combination

without substituting any other ini its place, he does
not infringe the plaintiff's patent;

and if he substitu-

tes another in place of one omitted, which is new, or
which performs substantially different functions even
if it is old, was not known at the date of the plaintiff's patont as a proper substitute, then the charge of
infringement

is not maintained."

In this case evi-

dence failed to sitisfy the Court that the supposed invention was ever completed, and consequently the statement of the Coutt must be regarded as dicta.
See also Carter v. Baker,(L

Fisher v. Craig (3),

(1) Whip Co v. Lambard, 4 Cliff.,
(2) Carter v. Baker, 1 Saw., 516.
(3) Fisher v. Craig, 3 Saw., 79.

405.
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Conover v. Roach, (1), where the doctrine is clearly recognizedbut the decision may be
grounds.

supported on other

Burden v. Corning (2),

the doctrine was not

laid down in the opinion, but the importance of the date
of the inve.:tion is constantly kept in mind by the Court,
in its determination of the controversity.

The same

may be said of Smith v. Dowing, 1 Fish., 64, where
House's telegraphic instrument was held not to be the
equivalent of that of Prof. Morse.
The third of i,.r.

Walker's cases is that of Leynor

v. Ostramf3), this being the decision of the Supreme
Court.

The opinion in this case is exceedingly long

and somewhat obscure.

Juctice Clifford undertakes to

explain and clear up many of thepnuoted questions in the
patent law.

The judgment of the Circuit Court was

reversed, and an injunction was granted aganist the defendants for infringing the Harvester of the plaintiff.
While the doctrine ws laid down, that one device in
order to be an equivalent of another must be known at

(1) Conover v. Roach, 4 Fish., 23.
(2) Burde. v. Corning, 4 Fish,, 477.
(3) Leynor v. Ostram, 11 Wail., 516. at p. 556.
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the date of the patent.

it appears not a necessary

point for deci sion as the infringement

could be sustain

ed on other grounds.
In Johnsoni v. Root, 2 Cliff.,

123, the case was

reversed by the Court on the ground that the verdict of
the

jury vias contrary.to the evidence.

The real

question Veing, whether the plaintiff had abandoned his

patent.

One of the questions presented in the irgu-

ment before the Circuit Vaurt was, as to the correction
of the charge that,

"If the plaintiff did not make any

such inventions as that deseribed in the third claim of
his-reissued letters patent in 1848, or if he did, and
did not reduce the same to practice in the form of an
operative sewing machine, then the jury were not authorized to find that the patented invention takes date
prior to the time when he filed application on his original patent."

The Court approved this charge.

Pouty v. Ruggles (1) appears to be cited as authority to
sustain the proposition, we have already sufficiently

(1) Pouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet., 336.

discussed.this case in another connection (1).
Suffice to say that this question was not decided here.
Gould v. Rees (2),

is one of the well known cases

of the patent law, two issues were raised, first that
there was no infringement,

second that the plaintiff

not the first inventor of the

improved device.

case was reversed and sent back because
rect charge to the jury.

was
The

of an incor-

The patent was for a com-

bination all the elements of which were old.

The doc-

trine was again laid down here, but the case as already sald, had to be reversed because of an incorrect
charge.

The court. said, "Where the defendant in con-

structing his machine, amits entirely one of the ingredients of the plaintiff's combination without substituting any other) he does not infringe; and if he substitutex any other in the place of the one omitted, which
is new,

or is old but not known at the date of the

plaintiff's invention as a proper substitue for the omitted ingredient, then he does not infringe.

(1) Page I Y
(2) Gould v. Rees, 15 Wal.,

187.

26
Mr.

Justict Clifford in

proposition in

this

form,

Gills v.

Weils

(1),

puts the

"Repeated decis tons of this

C~urt have settled the rule in such cases that
ingredient
left

substituted by the defendant

out in

if the

for the one

tht, defendant's machine was a newly dis-

covered one, or even an old one, performing some new
function,
tiff's
left

and also not known at the date of the plain-

patent,

or a proper substitute

out , the chrge

ed."

of infringement

The proposition

Let us examine ^one not

is

for the

ingredient

cannot be maintain--

supported by seven cases.

already referred to (2).

In Simpson v. Baltimore R.R. and Brooks v. Fisher,
(3) the

-,oint is not raised, but could be established

without being inconsistent with these decisions.
the later

case the question

the defendant had omitted
complainant's

for the jury had

In

een whether

one of the elements of the

device.

(1) Gills v. Wells, 22 Wal., I at page 31.
(2) Caver v. Tyde, 16 Pet., 514; Simpson v. R.R.
How., 329; Brooks v. Fisher, 15 '1ow. , 212; Vou-rse-V
Campbell, 1 Black, 428.
c os
(3)
v.
isher,,
sBr
15 -ow., 212 at 219.
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The case of Vouse V. Campbell (1),
to in

another connection

(,%),

already referred

the question of the omis-

sion of ani immaterial ingredient

in

the combination

came before 'the court for adjudication.
Our next cain 101 U.S., 656.
patent for a

is

Imhauser v, Buerk, reported

In 1865, Jacob Burke received a
time indicator, Itc]ians
the patent was

infringed by the device of Meyer who set up as a defense
that Buerk was not the first
the indicator,

and original inventor of

and a general denial of the infringement.

The Court decided the ease on t-iis point and said;

"

"Patentees of an invention consisting merely of a combination of old ingredients are entitled to equivalents,
by which is

meant that the patent in

the respective
ers ever-

respect to each of

ingredients comprising the invention cov-

other ingredient which in

the arrangement

of

the parts will perform the same function, if it is well
known as a proper substitute for the one described in
the specification %t the date of the patent.

(1)

Vouse v.

(2)

Page /sj,

Campbell,

1 Black, 427.

Hence it

28
follows that a party who merely
gredient

for one of the

it

is

the substance substituted

the same function as the ingredient

so substituted,

another in-

ingredients of' the patented com-

bination 18 an infringer if
performs

subatitutes

and it

appears that

known at the date of the ratent

that

it

it

for which
is

we.Al

was adaptable to

that case."
It

is

o. necessary to carry this

discusion farther

other than to say that the rule appears to be well settled in England.

Union v. reath, 5 H.L.Qas., 505,

where Justice Williams said that he fully agreed with
the doctrine which has been repeatedly laid down in the
course of this

d~scussion,

that althiough the use of a

chemical or mechanical substitute, which is a known
equivalent

to the thing pointed out by the specification

and claimed as the inventiozi,
of the patent yet if

amounts to an infringement

the equivalent were not knwon to be

so at the date of thejpptent and specification,
of it

is

no infringement.

the use
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Having -. ow a general
equivalent,

idea of the definition

together with the ele!-.ents composing

only remain.s to determine who is
doctrine

of an

entitled

it;

it

to invoke the

,-nrd to what extent.

There was at one time an attempt to prevent the
inventor of a combination from applying the doctrine
mechanical
sioi s

--t

equivalent

the present

to protect
time

are uniformly

applicatioi. ,c,
supra) it

his ptent,

.

.

in

of

the 6ao-isfavor of its

In Whip v.

wai contended by the complainants,

Lambard,

that the

patentee or owner of a patent for a combination is an
much entitled
of any ,0th r
to

to an e ,uivalentas
invention.

the patentee

or oycer

Doubt at one time existed as

the correctness of this proposition, but

it is now

well settled in accordance with the views of the com-

plainant.

Citing Gould v.

-ees and Gill v.

Wells.

In the former it wlas said, "Bona fide inventors of a
combination are as much entitled to equivalents as the
inventors of other patentable improvements."

It

is

of

30 r

course obvious that while the combination patentee

is

entitled to the benefi, of the doctrine, yet from the i,.herent nature of this patent- the application cannot be
as broad as that of a discoverer.
The material question however)is to determine %,
whether the inventor is a pioneer in his field, whether
he is the one who first conceived the idea and

made it

a
prarAicable, or whether

heAmerely an impromer, find-

ing the idea in a previous device and by his ingenui!ty
perfecting and making

ft

-ore useful.

if he is the

first or original inventor he can apply the doctrine of
equivalents in its broadest and most comprehensive
sense, even to the exclusion of one who improves and perfects his device, thus keeping to rimself, in a large
measure free from competition that which -e has made.
This doctrine wa- recognized and applied very far in
Clough v. Gil--ert Ce.,

(97 U.S.,

34), the opinion of the

Court is ;y Mr. Justice Blatchford.

Here Clough was

the first person who applied a valve regulation of any

31
kind to the combination, "And he is entitled under the
decisions hretofore made by this court to hold F, infringements all valve regulations, applied to such a combination, which perform the same officd in substantially
the same way, and were known equivalents for his form of
valve regulation."
In

T-c'ori

ck v.

Talcott

(1),

a leading ca e,

has already been referred to) the Court say that if

which
he be

the original inventor of the device or machine called
014k

the divider, he will have a right to treat allA infringer
who make dividers operating on the same principle and
performing the same functions by an analogous means or
equivalent

coii binations, even though the infringing
improvement
machine being an xxfxing1mE±xwpxa upon a known machine by a mere change of form or combination of parts,
The pate:,.te<- cann-ot treat another as an infringer who
h~s not improved the original machine by use of a different form or combination performing the same functions.
The inventor

of the first improvement cannot invoke

(1) McCormick v. Calcot:, 20 How., 402 at page 405.
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the doctrine

of equivaleits to supress all

ments which are not mere
But in

colorable

other iiprove-

evasions of the

first,

dealing with improvers we must narrow and

restrict our doctrine.

B ecause an imnentorjwho is

only an i, prover and not

the first

entitled to invoke, broadly,

in

the

art)

is

not

the doctrine of mechanical

equivalents so as to cover deviees -not specifically
named (1).

The reason for this restriction appears

to be this.

The improver and the alleged infringer

as to the prior devices stand in the same position as
to its

use,

nether being entitled

to a patent

for the

prior device and each (for our purpose) having a right
to use it; this patent

is for their element or instru-

ment which improves the prior device, and not for the
entire device as improved, so when the Courts say that
construed they mean, that

their

patent

is

to be strictly

their

pat1. t

is

niecessarily narrow being for this

ment only.
must ude their

improve

So that a person to infrinve thoir patent
improved

combination,

or an equivalent

thereof.
-------------------------------------------------

(1) Tobey Co. v. Colby, 34 Q.G., 1276.
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A good illustration of this proposition is the case
of Taylor v. Garreston, 18 Blatch., where the plaintiff's
invention being only an improvement
a

of cert,-in parts of

known machine, he cannot treat another as an infring-

er because he has improved the previously existing
machine

or machine,,

by using a

device or combination substantially

form,

construction,

different

from that

invented and patented by the plaintiff, though performing the same functions.
For

furthcur i±lustrations

on Patents sec.

256-7.

FINIS.

see Prof.Robinsons work
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